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SEA POWER IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
 The Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) was one of the defining conflicts of the ancient Greek world� It involved almost all the Greek city-states, aligned 
with one of the two main protagonists, Athens and Sparta� Conventionally it is 
seen as a war between a great land power, Sparta, and a great sea power, Athens� 
The effect of viewing the war in this way is to give less prominence to the place 
of sea power in the conduct of the war, with that element viewed as relevant to 
only one side� Many scholars acknowledge that Athenian war strategy was pri-
marily a maritime strategy and that Sparta only defeated Athens once the former 
had embraced the use of sea power against the latter� This is the basic narrative, 
and it is essentially correct� However, there is little appraisal of how sea power 
was used in the conduct of the war� This is unfortunate, since the Peloponnesian 
War is an excellent example of the uses and effectiveness of sea power� A more 
thorough examination of the thirty-year war be-
tween Sparta and Athens and their respective allies 
reveals a conflict in which sea power was of critical 
importance�
Sea power in the Peloponnesian War is visible 
along the full spectrum of maritime operations� 
Following Ken Booth and Eric Grove, modern 
naval operations commonly are divided into three 
main categories—the “span of maritime tasks,” in 
current Australian maritime doctrine: military, 
diplomatic, and constabulary (policing)�1 An 
examination of naval operations during the Pelo-
ponnesian War makes clear that, even at that time, 
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naval forces conducted operations that spanned these three basic categories in 
ways that are recognizable to the modern observer�
These categories are not intended to be prescriptive, and naval operations of-
ten span several different tasks; current Chinese antipiracy operations in the Gulf 
of Aden can be seen as both constabulary and diplomatic in nature, for instance� 
What these categories aid in illustrating is the many and varied operations that 
navies conduct and how sea power is used, and used differently, by various pow-
ers and with different strategies in place�
The strategy of Athens under the leadership of the statesman Pericles was con-
spicuously and unambiguously maritime in nature� Under his leadership, Athens 
would import all its required foodstuffs, avoid land battle with the dreaded 
Spartan phalanx, and conduct amphibious operations against Spartan territory� 
Athenian war strategy changed significantly in the second half of the Pelopon-
nesian War (413–404 BCE), but it nevertheless remained a maritime strategy�2 
This portion of the struggle commonly and misleadingly is referred to as the 
Decelean War, but the Ionian War is a more appropriate term� The fortification 
of Decelea in Attica did separate Athens from a large part of its countryside and 
cut off the land route to the critically important island of Euboea, and this forti-
fication did define to a strong degree Athenian and Spartan strategy for the final 
years of the war� However, the actual conduct of the war was carried out almost 
entirely in the eastern Aegean and up to the Hellespont (Dardanelles) region� It 
was a war defined by maritime operations: the interdiction of trade; diplomatic 
coercion; amphibious operations; and pitched naval battles, on both a small and 
a large scale� Examining these operations provides a better picture of how the war 
was conducted and brings its truly maritime nature to the fore, allowing the value 
of studying this period to be appreciated fully�
SEA POWER AND TECHNOLOGY
Before examining maritime and naval operations in the Peloponnesian War, it is 
important to address the issue of technology and the limitations imposed on na-
val forces of the period� Too many scholars, of both classical history and modern 
strategic thought, consider technology to have been so primitive as to render the 
study of maritime strategy in ancient history pointless� Chapter titles found in 
some works clearly demonstrate the poor regard in which some hold the naval 
operations of this era (e�g�, “The Pre-naval Era” [James Cable]; “Land Warfare 
Afloat: Before 1650” [Michael A� Palmer])�3
Palmer especially makes sweeping statements about the technological effec-
tiveness of ancient fleets, most notably that it was only with the advent of Euro-
pean sailing navies that states sought to command the seas by destroying enemy 
fleets�4 Yet the fifth-century BCE naval battles of Salamis, Mycale, Arginusae, and 
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Aegospotami involved fleet actions aimed at removing the opposing fleet from 
the sea—with some or a complete measure of success� Also worthy of mention 
are the numerous battles fought during the third-century BCE First Punic War 
between Carthage and Rome, most notably the battle of the Aegates Islands, a 
naval battle that effectively decided the outcome of the war in Rome’s favor, with 
widespread and long-lasting consequences, especially with regard to the Second 
Punic War� Roman sea power ensured that the general Hannibal had to walk to 
Italy rather than go by sea�5 Palmer’s assertion is limited severely in both time and 
space, seeming to posit sea command theory as a European, Enlightenment-era 
phenomenon� An assertion as sweeping as Palmer’s is not backed by historical 
evidence, and the Peloponnesian War example is an effective corrective�
As the debate raged over whether Sparta and its allies should go to war with 
Athens, the historian Thucydides has the Corinthians pushing for war, writing, 
“A single defeat at sea is in all likelihood their [Athens’s] ruin�”6 Whether this 
was a genuine Corinthian view or an Athenian fear that Thucydides projected 
through a speech is immaterial to this particular argument� Irrespective of view-
point, the idea that the war in general, not just the war at sea, could be resolved 
in one great fleet action was clearly in evidence 2,500 years ago� The historian 
Diodorus Siculus states that late in the war, in approximately 410, the Spartans 
thought that for them to lose at sea constituted no more than a setback, since they 
were still supreme on land, but that defeat at sea for Athens would result in that 
city fighting for its very survival�7 Indeed, by that stage of the war the Athenians 
were clinging on to a fragile empire, with their resources severely depleted, while 
Sparta’s “center of gravity,” the Peloponnese, was safe from the depredations of 
the Athenians�8
This line of thinking on decisive battle has a striking parallel in the early 
twentieth century and the First World War� It is reminiscent of the German naval 
strategy under Admiral Tirpitz of a “risk fleet”: the idea that the inferior German 
High Seas Fleet could catch a portion of the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet and defeat 
it, thus—with one grand battle—altering the balance of naval power in favor of 
Germany�9 The Athenians in 480 were able to erode the Persian fleet’s fighting 
ability at Artemisium, admittedly with the help of a storm, and soon after at Sala-
mis were able to defeat the Persians at sea, making the decisive land battle at Pla-
taea possible and thus saving Greece�10 The aforementioned Corinthian speech is 
an explicit expression of decisive naval battle as a conscious strategy� Taken with 
the Persian Wars example, the Corinthian and Spartan examples show that over 
a 2,500-year period, the concept of a “Mahanian” battle at sea to determine the 
outcome of a war remained an appealing and viable strategy with roots in the 
classical Greek era�11
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The purpose here is not to disregard technological limitations or minimize 
the importance of technology, but to illustrate the enduring nature of some basic 
tenets of naval warfare and maritime strategy� Technological limitations often are 
used to justify a view that navies of the time could not participate in any contest 
for control of the sea� Cable criticizes Mahan’s exploration of sea control during 
the Second Punic War, writing that Mahan does not mention the very limited 
sea-keeping capacities of Roman galleys or their dependence on coast hugging as 
almost their sole mode of navigation—as if these aspects had any bearing on the 
concept of sea control�12 The basic fact of the matter was that the Romans could 
do what they wanted at sea and the Carthaginians were restricted severely in their 
ability to use the sea for their own purposes—as clear an example of control of 
the sea as any other throughout history�13 Sea control should be thought of as a 
relative concept, not an absolute one�
SEA CONTROL
The concept of sea control is certainly in evidence during the Peloponnesian War, 
despite the restrictions of technology� In the second year of the war, Thucydides 
has Pericles console the people of Athens, telling them that there are two do-
mains, land and sea, and that the Athenians hold sway over the sea—not only 
as they are doing so at present, but to whatever extent they think fit� Moreover, 
“your naval resources are such that your vessels may go where they please, with-
out the [Persian] king or any other nation on earth being able to stop them�”14 
This was a bold assertion, and one made in the context of a political speech to the 
Athenian population; yet the basic premise was correct� Events of the year had 
demonstrated that the Athenians could sail where and when they wanted� There 
were some exceptions, such as the virtually unopposed Spartan raid on Salamis, 
which caused a panic in Piraeus, but this helps demonstrate a basic tenet of sea 
control: it is limited in time and space�15 While technological considerations pre-
cluded what might be called “sea command” from being exercised, this is true of 
most times in the history of naval warfare�16 The state of sea control throughout 
the war passed from Athenian control of the sea, to a contested sea, and finally 
to Spartan control of the sea� Moreover, as Pericles’s speech illustrates, the idea 
of navies being able to establish sea control at this time was a conscious strategic 
concept� Again, that these changes in sea control are readily apparent invalidates 
arguments that such concepts were not present in the classical world�
The ultimate role of navies, both past and present, is to fight and win at sea� 
Although naval battles may occur infrequently, all other roles that navies under-
take are dependent on the ability to fight and win against an enemy� There is little 
possibility of conducting amphibious operations, diplomatic coercion, or trade 
protection if a naval force cannot prevail over an enemy in battle� This principle 
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is demonstrated amply throughout the Peloponnesian War� Athens’s ability to 
prevail in battles at sea allowed it to gain and maintain sea control�
THE STRATEGY OF PERICLES AND HIS SUCCESSORS
Athenian strategy under Pericles has been the source of much debate and mis-
conception� It was a maritime strategy and it was a defensive strategy� Athens was 
fortified with walls, both those around the city itself and the long constructions 
that ran down to the port of Piraeus� This effectively sealed off Athens from en-
emies; siege warfare of the time relied primarily on a besieging force starving the 
city out or being let in by forces within the city� It was not until the era of Philip of 
Macedon in the fourth century that siege weapons developed to a point at which 
besieging forces could threaten the walls of a city directly� Able to import all the 
food it required, Athens was a metaphorical island—a concept pushed by Pericles 
and the unidentified author referred to as “the Old Oligarch�”17 With the safety of 
the city almost guaranteed and its supply lines assured, Athens could strike out 
at Sparta and Spartan allies using superior sea power�
The strategy of Pericles was an evolution of the strategy developed by 
those who had come before him, back to Themistocles and the Persian Wars� 
Thucydides sees Themistocles as the one who spurred Athens into becoming 
a sea power, thereby laying the foundations of the Athenian empire� This was 
because Themistocles in 478 had the Athenians rebuild their city walls, as well as 
the long walls connecting the city to the town and port of Piraeus� He allegedly 
advised the Athenians that if they were ever to find themselves hard pressed by 
land, they should go down to Piraeus and defy the world with their fleet� Before 
the battle of Salamis in 480, a Corinthian delegate attacked Themistocles’s coun-
sel, dismissing him because Athens had been evacuated and thus he did not even 
have a city to his name� Themistocles replied that not only did he have a city, but 
he had one even greater than the Corinthians—so long as the Athenians had 250 
ships fully manned�18 Athens’s decision to rebuild the city’s walls caused anxiety 
in Sparta, although it was Sparta’s allies that allegedly instigated the Spartans to 
confront Athens, because they feared the Athenian navy and the valor the Athe-
nians had displayed against Persia�19 It is noteworthy that Thucydides maintains 
that it was Sparta’s allies who were most concerned, for these allies were nearer to 
the coast than Sparta itself, and therefore more vulnerable to Athenian sea power� 
Plutarch put it bluntly in his biography of Themistocles, writing that he “fastened 
the city to the Piraeus and the land to the sea�”20
The walls of Athens were important to defense against Spartan and other 
hoplites, but, as Themistocles supposedly made clear to the other Greeks, it was 
the fleet that formed the basis of Athenian power from the Persian Wars onward� 
At this early stage, it was a defensive strategy, although the Athenians engaged 
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in various overseas campaigns before the Peloponnesian War� However, with the 
Delian League slowly morphing into the Athenian empire, the Athenians found 
themselves able to draw on vast resources� This solidified Athenian strategy, 
which is illustrated clearly in the fifth-century work of the Old Oligarch� The 
first point he makes is about Athenian hoplites: although they may be no match 
for their enemies, they are still stronger than their tribute-paying allies—and 
that was sufficient�21 It is a strong indication that the Athenians did not intend 
to use their land forces to confront their enemies directly in pitched battle— 
making it all the more clear that Athens’s grand strategy was a maritime one�22 
The city-state’s land army need only be stronger than that of any of the allied 
states� Even so, if the need arose the Athenians could use this inferior force in 
a superior way: their navy could land a superior force of troops wherever they 
wished� The author notes that “it is possible for the rulers of the sea to sometimes 
do as land powers do, to ravage the land of the stronger; for it is possible to sail 
about wherever there is no enemy or wherever they are few, and to embark to sail 
away as the enemy approaches�”23 During the Peloponnesian War, Athenian raids 
on the Peloponnese demonstrated this many times� The author is highlighting 
the mobility of Athenian land forces� There was no need for them to engage in a 
futile and destructive hoplite battle to defend Attica�
As the Old Oligarch explains further, Athens exploited geography to its strate-
gic advantage� Land powers could band together easily, whereas the sea separated 
islands geographically� Athens controlled this sea, and even if it failed initially to 
prevent the islanders from coming together, it still could cut them off from out-
side supplies and starve them out�24 The infamous threat leveled against Melos 
during the Peloponnesian War was made with the understanding that Athens’s 
navy could cut off and invade the small island without outside interference� As 
for the mainland cities, Athens ruled over them by fear� This was not because of 
a superior land army, but through a combination of Athens being able to control 
the flow of imports and exports and the superior mobility granted by its strong 
navy�25 Athens’s sea power, in theory and practice, became primarily an offensive 
force in the lead-up to the Peloponnesian War�
The separation of the operational from the strategic level of war aids in clari-
fying Athenian strategy during the first part of the Peloponnesian War, known 
as the Archidamian War� This requires caution, as there are no definite lines 
between these two levels, and the Peloponnesian War has received no such 
examination from scholars of either the classical world or modern military 
theory�26 Nevertheless, it is a useful way to examine the war without conflating 
policy, strategy, and operations� At its core, strategy is about “maintaining a bal-
ance between ends, ways, and means; about identifying objectives; and about the 
resources and methods available for meeting such objectives�”27 Under Pericles’s 
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strategy, Athens was a city protected from land attack, with a powerful navy ca-
pable of power projection and an empire that provided a huge amount of capital 
with which to fund a maritime war, which would end with the continuation of the 
status quo ante bellum. The campaigns that Athens launched against the Pelopon-
nese can be seen as the operational level of war: the precise ways in which Athens 
used means—sea power—to achieve its desired ends; in short, strategy in action� 
The strategy of Pericles did not, as Donald Kagan claims, fail; the successors of 
Pericles maintained essentially the same strategy, but pursued it more vigorously 
and more aggressively on an operational level�28 Pericles’s strategy was one of 
projecting maritime power as a means of coercing Sparta into peace, a strategy 
that ultimately succeeded in 421 with the Peace of Nicias, however imperfect 
Thucydides considered that peace to be�29
The opening of the war saw both Sparta and Athens initiate their war plans� 
Sparta invaded Attica in the hope of drawing out and defeating the incensed 
Athenian hoplites, while Athens gathered its allies and prepared a hundred ships 
for a raid on the Peloponnese�30 Kagan’s summary of the first year of the war has 
the Spartans doing widespread damage and the Athenians expending consider-
able time and money for little gain�31 Henry D� Westlake and John F� Lazenby 
also conclude that the Spartans inflicted more damage on Attica than the Athe-
nians did in return�32 These are poor assessments of the events of that first year, 
both overestimating the damage the Spartans inflicted and grossly simplifying 
and underestimating the damage Athens inflicted� There is little doubt that the 
Spartans’ invasion of Attica and their despoliation of the land upset Athenians 
greatly; Thucydides says so�33 However, the invasion and ravaging of Attica 
made the Athenians more angry and resolute than despairing, and it certainly 
demonstrated to the Spartans that their ravaging strategy would not induce the 
Athenians into any rash actions�34 It also assumes a negligible effort by Athens to 
defend Attica, which was not the case� As small as it might have been, Athens’s 
effort to defend Attica with cavalry both boosted morale and limited the dam-
age that the cavalry-deficient Spartan army could inflict�35 Many scholars have 
exaggerated the effects of Spartan efforts during the first year of the war, perhaps 
because the traditional nature of Spartan land invasion makes it appear more ef-
fective compared with the more unorthodox Athenian maritime strategy�
On the first point, instances of ravaging during this period appear to have been 
greatly exaggerated regarding their material effects� In his groundbreaking work 
Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece, Victor Davis Hanson quite convinc-
ingly argues that the systematic destruction of crops and the ravaging of land are 
extremely difficult� Grapevines and olive trees are extremely hardy and therefore 
difficult to destroy; doing so requires many hours� Further, grain is vulnerable to 
fire and other destruction only during a narrow time window� These conclusions 
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stem from practical experience in farming, as well as from close reading of 
the relevant literature� Of particular importance is a passage in the Hellenica 
Oxyrhynchia, in which the unknown author describes Attica before the Spartan 
fortification of Decelea as the most lavishly equipped part of Greece, having suf-
fered only slight damage from the Spartans in previous attacks�36 Thucydides too 
describes the fortification of Decelea as one of the prime causes of Athenian ruin, 
in stark contrast to the invasions of the Archidamian War�37 This should not be a 
surprise, since Hanson calculates that the Spartans spent a total of only 150 days 
in Attica during the entire Archidamian War�38 The idea that Sparta laid waste to 
Attica is hard to defend and the effectiveness of this Spartan strategy is overstated� 
Sparta’s original strategy was ultimately a failure, and it was only when Sparta 
embraced sea power that it defeated Athens—not in the fields of Attica, but on 
the seas from which Athens derived its power�39
In contrast, Athens’s accomplishments during the first year of the war were 
strategically significant, as it used sea power to strengthen its position greatly� 
The Athenians, along with a contingent of fifty ships from Corcyra and other 
allies, conducted their own ravaging of enemy territory� This raiding included an 
attack on the city of Methone in the helot homeland of Messenia, a strike into an 
area where the Spartans felt particularly vulnerable� Although the Athenians did 
not take the city, the attack clearly worried the Spartans� Concurrently with this 
operation, thirty Athenian ships raided farther north into Locris, taking hostages 
and defeating the Locrians who assembled there to resist them� Finally, the Athe-
nians secured the islands of Aegina and Cephalonia, the latter taken without a 
fight�40 Occupation of the former island ensured the security of the Saronic Gulf, 
and control of the latter helped secure a base off the west coast of the Pelopon-
nese and Acarnania�
It is arguable that by the end of the first year of the war the Athenians had done 
as much material damage to the Spartans as the Spartans had to the Athenians�41 
Plutarch goes so far as to write that not only did Athenian raids on the Pelopon-
nese cause more damage than the Spartan ones on Attica, but if the plague had 
not occurred the Spartans would have given up entirely�42 Far more important, 
and often overlooked by scholars, is the fact that Athens had accomplished far 
more than the Spartans in solidifying and improving its strategic position in 
Greece, as well as proving the capability and reach of Athenian sea power�
The offshore Greek islands were important strategic locations, and both sides 
targeted them� The Ambrakiots convinced the Spartans that conquering Acarna-
nia would lead to the taking of the islands of Zakynthos and Cephalonia, posses-
sion of which would make Athenian cruises around the Peloponnese much more 
difficult�43 Corcyra not only possessed a strong navy, but was situated on the best 
sailing route from Greece to Italy� Athens’s and Sparta’s respective interference in 
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Corcyrean affairs was aimed not at conquest but at establishing a friendly govern-
ment that would secure the island for their interests, especially control of the sea 
lines of communication (SLOCs)� An Athenian attack on the island of Kythera 
in 424 had a twofold purpose� First, the island was a landing place for merchant 
ships sailing from Libya and Egypt� Second, the island was in a position from 
which Laconia could be secured from attacks by “privateers,” which made it an 
excellent place for the Athenians to set up a base from which to raid the Pelopon-
nese�44 There is also the matter of money, as the Athenians were able to exact a 
tribute of four talents from Kythera, an important Spartan-allied city� This was 
not a departure from Athens’s original strategy, as Kagan claims, but a change in 
the operational conduct of the war�45 Athens still was using sea power offensively, 
attacking the Peloponnese and wearing down Sparta�
The culmination of the Periclean strategy was the Athenian success at Pylos 
and the capture of Spartan forces on the island of Sphacteria in 425� Thucydides 
labels the end result a stroke of enormous luck� Although luck certainly contrib-
uted to Athenian success, the matter should be seen not so simply, but as the 
fruition of Athenian maritime strategy�46 Once again Kagan is incorrect in call-
ing Demosthenes’s strategy a clear departure from previous Athenian strategy�47 
Although it is true, as he points out, that Pericles had mentioned establishing 
fortifications in the Peloponnese but never did so, Pericles’s death not long into 
the war means we cannot know whether the idea was only a vague and empty 
threat�48 Demosthenes’s decision to fortify Pylos demonstrates a continued, albeit 
belated, plan to increase pressure on Sparta through raids and attacks on its terri-
tory from the sea� Two modern scholars quite correctly interpret the Pylos cam-
paign as the logical corollary of the Periclean strategy�49 Although Thucydides 
writes that it was owing to a storm that the Athenians ended up at Pylos, he also 
states that it was the location where Demosthenes landed to “do what was wanted 
there” and to fortify the position, as that was the object of the voyage� This was 
not a random, deserted headland, as Thucydides has the two Athenian generals 
sneeringly say; it was territory in the heart of Messenia, among the helot popula-
tion that was such a constant worry to Sparta�50 The original Athenian plan, as 
Pericles had described it, was unchanged, merely pursued more aggressively at 
the operational level�
The Athenian decision to fortify Pylos quickly got the attention of the Spar-
tans� Once King Agis II and the Peloponnesians ravaging Attica heard the news, 
they marched back immediately, and once in Sparta they called together allies 
from around the Peloponnese�51 Once the Spartans attacked the Athenian gar-
rison on Pylos, they made the fateful decision to land a force of hoplites on the 
island of Sphacteria to prevent any Athenian relieving force from establishing a 
base nearby�52 The subsequent naval battle, in which Athens was victorious, also 
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had the effect of trapping the Spartan hoplites occupying Sphacteria� This situ-
ation was deemed so dire that the Spartan commanders resolved to conclude a 
truce on the spot� In fact, the Spartans felt the situation so serious that as part 
of the truce they temporarily surrendered to the Athenians all their warships in 
Laconia, sixty in total�53 The Spartans were willing to gut their naval power, weak 
as it already was, to retain their small contingent of men� This shows a lack of 
Spartan confidence with respect to naval matters, and it demonstrates clearly the 
Athenian amphibious capability� Athenian land and naval forces could be used 
in close concert not just to raid territory, but to deal a serious military blow to 
Sparta, one with severe political consequences�
The full magnitude of Athenian accomplishments during the Pylos campaign 
is evident in Spartan actions after the capture of their hoplites on Sphacteria� 
Thucydides calls the surrender of the (approximately) 120 Spartiates the most 
surprising thing to happen in the war�54 The most immediate result of the Spar-
tans being taken prisoner was the Athenian threat to execute them if the Spartans 
invaded Attica, thus ending the direct threat to Attica and freeing it up for full 
use�55 The Spartans sent envoys to Athens to recover both the prisoners and Py-
los, for they were seriously alarmed by the Messenian raids being conducted from 
Pylos into Laconia, as they stoked the age-old fear of widespread helot rebellion�56
The Athenians did not stop their naval operations of 425 with Pylos� They 
raided Crommyon in Corinthian territory and established a fortified base at 
Methana from which they could raid into the territory of Troezen�57 In the north-
west the Athenians based in Naupactus made an expedition against Anactorion, a 
Corinthian-controlled city, taking it and settling people from Acarnania there�58 
This meant that the entire north coast of the Corinthian Gulf from Naupactus to 
Ambracia, with the minor exception of Molycreion, was hostile to Corinth� These 
widespread amphibious operations demonstrate a powerful Athenian maritime, 
and especially naval, capability and a strategy that was aggressively expeditionary 
in nature�
Thucydides gives a very blunt assessment of the events described above, and 
of their effects on Sparta as well� The Spartans split their forces and stationed 
them throughout the most threatened areas of the Peloponnese, and took the 
unusual step of raising a force of cavalry and archers to act as a mobile reserve� 
Thucydides describes the Spartans as on the defensive, fearing internal revolu-
tion, afraid of another disaster like the one that had befallen them at Pylos, and 
lacking all confidence in themselves�59 The cause of this anxiety and outright fear 
was constant, unimpeded Athenian raiding along the Peloponnesian seaboard�60 
This scourge was made possible by a strong Athenian navy that could land a force 
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of troops in hostile territory, protect them from enemy naval intervention, and 
bring them off again safely or keep them supplied and protected so they could 
cause even greater damage�
Although Pericles’s strategy essentially remained in play throughout the first 
decade of the war, there were departures from it as the war expanded into new ar-
eas such as Sicily and the Chalcidice region� Nevertheless, these campaigns were 
also expeditionary in nature, relying heavily on naval force to project power into 
coastal and island regions� The first expedition to Sicily constituted a departure 
from Pericles’s strategy, although the ostensible aim was not conquest but the 
provision of aid to Athens’s Sicilian allies� Thucydides does give the Athenians a 
more sinister motive, calling the expedition a test of how vulnerable Sicily might 
be to Athenian conquest, but this interpretation should be viewed with caution�61 
The first Sicilian expedition was primarily diplomatic in nature, and Thucydides 
perhaps downplays the importance of the Athenians’ attempts at aiding their 
western allies� After all, the Peloponnesians had strong friends in the west too, 
and for Athens to ignore its allies’ call for help would have weakened its position 
in the west, if not in the other territories where it had allies� Because failure to 
aid its allies would have made Athens look weak, the dispatch of a naval expedi-
tion to Sicily in 427 can be seen as a response to external events rather than as a 
radical change in the conduct of the war and Athens’s strategy, if not policy� As 
the war dragged on, it became more complex, and these instances highlight the 
ever-important point that strategy is not practiced in a vacuum�
Spartan operations in the Chalcidice region in the later years of the Archi-
damian War mark a change in Sparta’s strategy that reveals the effectiveness of 
Athenian strategy up to that point� Thucydides explicitly states that Spartan op-
erations in the northwest Aegean were aimed at distracting Athens and relieving 
the pressure it was putting on the Peloponnese, Laconia in particular� Further 
and even more importantly, Thucydides writes that the Spartans were happy to 
have an excuse to send out helots from the Peloponnese, since the occupation of 
Pylos was thought to have increased the chances of a helot revolt�62 It also marks 
the point at which Sparta abandoned all hope of confronting Athens at sea until 
well after the Peace of Nicias, for it decided to avoid naval operations in favor 
of a purely land campaign� However, Spartan success in the northwest Aegean 
presaged a bolder and more successful strategy to be undertaken during the 
Decelean/Ionian War, when Sparta would use Persian money to build a fleet and 
conduct its own amphibious operations against the Athenians in the Ionian is-
land and Anatolian regions� Sparta recognized that the most effective strategy for 
victory was to separate Athens from its allies, by force or otherwise� This strategy 
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was tested and found to be successful during the campaigns in the Chalcidice 
region, but it could not be executed after the failure of the Mytilinean revolt and 
Pylos campaigns eroded and ultimately destroyed Spartan naval capabilities.
OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OF BATTLE
Diplomacy
He [Pericles] displayed their power to the barbarian tribes living around 
and to the kings and lords the power and the confidence and impunity 
with which they sailed where they wished, having made all of the sea 
subject to their control.
PLUTARCH, LIFE OF PERICLES
Naval forces have many roles outside of war and combat operations, foremost 
among them in diplomacy. Diplomatic tasks range from furnishing allies with 
moral and physical support to coercion, and all these roles fell within the scope 
of action of Greek maritime forces during the Peloponnesian War. Navies were—
and still are—uniquely placed to act as diplomatic tools; armies are inherently 
intrusive, whereas navies can remain at a distance, threatening or reassuring as 
desired without instigating hostilities.
The Plutarch passage quoted above details an Athenian expedition that 
Pericles conducted in approximately 436 and that is an excellent example of the 
use of naval force for diplomatic purposes. The fleet’s presence off the coast of 
the Aegean Islands and Black Sea region demonstrated the Athenians’ potential 
power to friend and foe alike, without actually encroaching on any territory or 
engaging in a hostile act. The Peloponnesian War involved many different pro-
tagonists spread throughout the Mediterranean, and most of them were within 
reach of the sea, providing a city with the opportunity to aid or menace with its 
navy as it saw fit, exercising both soft and hard diplomacy.
Pericles’s show of force in 436 was aimed at Greeks and foreigners alike, 
powers with which they were at peace at the time. As Plutarch understands, it 
was more than a matter of simply sailing a large body of warships around; the 
real point of the exercise was to demonstrate Athenian sea control. The ships 
displayed naval and military power in a region distant from Athens, with the im-
plication that the Athenians could project this power anywhere and at any time, 
thus enjoying the power, confidence, and impunity to sail where they wished, 
“having made all of the sea subject to their control.”63 This was no idle threat, 
for the opening years of the Peloponnesian War demonstrated that the Athenian 
fleet indeed could sail where it wished and land troops in strategically significant 
areas. Further, Plutarch writes that Pericles did many things to please the people, 
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including “sending out sixty triremes each and every year, in which many of 
the citizens were sailing for eight months being paid.”64 This acted as an annual 
demonstration of Athenian sea power to the Aegean world. Some scholars believe 
that sixty ships is too large a number, pointing out that it would have incurred 
too great an annual cost; but, regardless of numbers, it remains an example of the 
frequent use of Athens’s navy for diplomatic purposes.65 Russell Meiggs suggests 
that the main function of the fleet in peacetime was as a police force, with the 
threefold duty of showing the flag, instilling confidence in the hearts of friends, 
and suppressing piracy.66 Although correctly identifying the roles, he mistakenly 
identifies the first two as constabulary operations, when they are in fact diplo-
matic ones—the two most prominent and important diplomatic roles that navies 
undertake. The ultimate goal of such posturing was to establish in the minds of 
friend and foe alike the Athenian capacity and will to control the seas. Athenian 
power and influence were extended across the regions through the use of naval 
forces in a diplomatic role.67
An episode that occurred at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War neatly 
demonstrates the diplomatic use of sea power. Athens decided to conclude a 
defensive treaty with the island state of Corcyra in 433; both Thucydides and 
Plutarch write that Athens needed to aid Corcyra, lest its naval power go over 
to Athens’s rival, Corinth.68 Athens sent ten ships to aid Corcyra. Especially 
noteworthy was the inclusion of three strategoi to command the contingent.69 
Considering that Athens elected ten strategoi for each year, three is a high level 
of command for such a small number of ships; a later raid on the Peloponnese 
during the first year of the war involving a hundred ships had the same number of 
strategoi.70 Indeed, the three commanders sent to Corcyra were under very strict 
instructions to do nothing that might provoke Corinth or lead to a violation of 
the treaty Athens had with it, but to prevent an incursion into Corcyraean ter-
ritory. Athens sent out a tightly controlled force of ships to aid an ally, Corcyra, 
while simultaneously making a show of force and a demonstration of Athenian 
resolve in the face of Corinthian aggression. Kagan puts it best when he describes 
this maneuver as less a military than a diplomatic one.71
The contention that the Athenian orders were unrealistic misses the point 
that it was a diplomatic rather than a military use of sea power.72 It was the pres-
ence of Athenian ships to begin with, as opposed to their number, that was the 
entire point, and the fact that three strategoi commanded them shows the delicate 
nature of the task. From the outset of political tensions, Athens employed naval 
force as a diplomatic tool. That Pericles did not go with the force is perhaps a 
good indication that the other Athenian leaders clearly understood his aims.
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Trade Protection and Interdiction
The protection and interdiction of trade have been among the prime duties of na-
vies throughout history, and the conduct of such operations during the Pelopon-
nesian War was critical to its outcome� Both sides engaged in the protection of 
their own and the interdiction of enemy seaborne trade, although it was Athens 
that had the most to lose from an interruption of trade� Operations ranged from 
the employment of “privateers” and direct attacks on shipping to the control of 
vital SLOCs� These operations are not as well documented as the other maritime 
operations undertaken during the war, either in the ancient sources or by modern 
scholars, but they remained vital, and it was Athens’s inability to protect trade, 
particularly in foodstuffs, that led to its surrender following blockade and starva-
tion by Sparta�
In the second year of the war the Athenians sent six ships under a certain 
Melesandros to the region of Caria and Lycia, located on the Anatolian coast� 
Melesandros’s tasks were twofold: to collect tribute and to prevent “the Pelopon-
nesian privateers” from attacking merchantmen�73 Both Richard Crawley and Rex 
Warner, translators of two of the most popular editions of Thucydides, translate 
leistikos in the above passage as privateer�74 However, leistikos usually is translated 
as pirate or bandit, as the term was equally applicable to such activities on land 
and sea� Labeling them privateers implies that the Spartans employed them to 
attack only the shipping of Athens and Athenian allies�
In the first year of the war Athens had fortified the island of Atalante off 
the Opuntian coast to prevent leistikoi from sailing out of Opus and the rest of 
Locris and attacking Euboea�75 It was only with the outbreak of war that Athens 
suddenly had found the need to fortify this particular position, suggesting that 
piracy was not an enduring regional issue of concern to Athens� In this case, it 
appears that Sparta engaged locals to privateer against the Athenians� Locris’s 
position near Euboea—an island important for the support of Athens—made it a 
good base of operations, yet the Spartans’ navy was so weak it was unlikely they 
could establish their own base there: thus the need to gain the support of leistikoi�
As for direct attacks on trade, there is a vague reference to the Spartans attack-
ing Athenian and allied traders at sea at the very beginning of the war, but the 
narrative is quite unspecific and stands out most for highlighting the brutality 
of the Spartans�76 A more detailed instance appears in 412/1, when the Spartan 
Hippocrates was sent out with one Laconian and eleven Sicilian ships to Cnidus 
on the Ionian coast� Half the ships were ordered to seize all merchant vessels 
sailing from Egypt�77 However, the Athenians became aware of this and sent out 
their own ships, which intercepted and captured the Peloponnesian ships� This 
negated the threat to the merchant vessels, which presumably were carrying grain 
to the Athenians in the region�78 In 410, the Spartan king Agis sent fifteen ships, 
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manned by allies, to Chalcedon and Byzantium, and en route three of them were 
destroyed in the Hellespont by the nine Athenian ships that were always present 
to watch over merchantmen�79 These examples show that the Athenians were on 
constant watch for threats to their merchant vessels and had mechanisms in place 
for the wartime control of grain throughout the Aegean�80
The final way in which trade was attacked or protected was through the con-
trol of shipping routes—the vital SLOCs� Having established supremacy over the 
waters of the Propontis (Sea of Marmara) after the victory at Cyzicus, Athens was 
able to control the flow of shipping via this route and collect a tax on all vessels 
sailing into the region from the Black Sea� King Agis summed up Spartan despair 
at the Athenian control of grain routes� “But Agis, seeing [from Attica] the many 
grain ships sailing into the Piraeus, was saying that it was of no advantage for 
them [Sparta] to shut out the Athenians from the land for much time already, if 
they could not hold back the grain imported by sea�”81
It was evident to the Spartans that, despite occupying Athenian territory in 
Attica year-round, they could win only by cutting Athens off from its overseas 
food supply� This was achieved best through control of Athens’s main SLOC, 
which by the end of the war ran through the Bosporus and Hellespont� Black Sea 
grain was critical to Athens, and had been possibly as far back as the late 430s� 
The loss of Euboea in 411 was a disaster for Athens, not just because of the loss of 
ships in the battle off Eretria, but for the loss of an important source of grain and 
other supplies; Thucydides held that the island was of more value than Attica�82 
Athens previously had imported grain from a range of different areas, but gradual 
Spartan pressure eventually forced the Athenians into relying on importations 
solely from the Black Sea region� By closing down the last available grain SLOC 
to Athens, Sparta finally was able to starve Athens into submission�
LESSONS
The Peloponnesian War of 431–404 BCE was a maritime war, one characterized 
by the constant use of sea power by Athens, Sparta, and their respective allies� The 
lands surrounding the cities of both protagonists were not the scenes of great, or 
even many, battles� From Sicily in the west to the Bosporus in the east, it was the 
littoral areas, and especially the islands, that saw endemic warfare throughout 
three decades of conflict� There were only two large-scale land battles during 
this period, and none in which the full forces of the Athenians and Spartans were 
involved� Soldiers certainly had their part to play in the Peloponnesian War, but 
it was the ability to project power at and from the sea that was the determining 
factor in the war�
At the core of Athenian strategy, from the very beginning of the war, was the 
capability to project power ashore from the sea� Athenian ships cruising by the 
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island or coastal city of a recalcitrant ally were effective diplomatically because it 
was understood that they could cause serious damage� When it came to fighting 
Sparta, the Athenians’ ability to raid the coast of the Peloponnese was central to 
their war strategy, and one to which the Spartans had no effective response� Athe-
nian attacks demonstrated that without a navy and in spite of Spartan attacks on 
Attica, Sparta could not protect its allies from Athenian naval forces� The walls of 
Athens protected the city from the vaunted Spartan hoplites, just as the seas and 
Athenian triremes protected Athens’s allies� Maritime power projection by the 
Athenians demonstrated the impotence of the Spartan land army, and raised the 
specter of helot rebellion as well� The Athenian victory at Pylos and Sphacteria in 
425 is the starkest example of these facts and was the vindication of the Periclean 
strategy, regardless of how later politicians chose to exploit or throw away this 
important victory� The Sicilian expedition was the largest amphibious operation 
conducted to that time, and the operations conducted at sea had a critical impact 
on the fate of the expedition—in the Corinthian Gulf, off the coast of Italy, and 
in the Great Harbor of Syracuse� This outcome was of great consequence to the 
rest of the war because it enabled a Spartan strategy of confronting Athens at sea� 
The final years of the war were fought primarily in the eastern Aegean and saw 
both sides conducting maritime power-projection operations around the islands 
and the Hellespont region�
The use of maritime power for diplomatic and political purposes was cru-
cial, especially for the Athenians, who relied so heavily on a maritime empire 
for support� Sea power granted Athens the power to keep allies in line and dis-
suade them from rebellion� The Old Oligarch baldly states this as the case, and 
Thucydides’s narrative of the war supports this analysis� When Athenian naval 
power weakened, Sparta was able to draw away from Athens this base of support 
and compromise the Athenians’ ability to fight� Aside from tribute collection 
from allies, both sides used the threat of naval force to extort money out of third 
powers� Athens began the war with a firmly entrenched maritime consciousness 
that had seen naval force used for diplomatic means on a daily basis� Both sides 
used navies as tools of diplomacy, especially as coercive forces with great reach�
Maritime trade was a critical Athenian vulnerability that required protec-
tion, especially as Spartan actions in Attica deepened Athenian dependence on 
imports of food by sea� Athenian hegemony in the Aegean had helped suppress 
piracy, but clearly there were plenty of would-be pirates and opportunists who 
were willing and able to enlist with Sparta to attack Athenian shipping� This 
state-sponsored piracy, akin to privateering in modern legal terms, demonstrated 
Sparta’s recognition of the need to hit Athens at sea to damage its maritime trade� 
As the war dragged on and Athens became reliant on grain imports from the 
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Hellespont region and beyond, this theater became a crucial one in the conduct 
of the war as Sparta tried to close the strait to Athens� It was Athens’s inability to 
keep its SLOCs open and thereby feed itself that led to defeat�
The maritime operations that Greek forces conducted during the Pelopon-
nesian War would have been impossible without navies’ ability to fight at sea� 
Battle, on whatever scale, was of critical importance throughout the war� Posses-
sion of a strong fleet that was proven in battle allowed Athens to bully other states 
by merely sailing its fleet around the Aegean and beyond� Without establishing 
sea control with its fleet, Athens would not have been able to conduct a concerted 
campaign of maritime power projection against Sparta and its allies� The Athe-
nians certainly would not have gained a victory as stunning as the one at Pylos/
Sphacteria without the ability to defeat the Spartan fleet in battle� It was only 
when Sparta took to the seas with a fleet that it was able to cause serious harm to 
Athens, which caused the latter’s allies to rebel and threatened its maritime trade� 
Sparta’s eventual transformation into a naval power, no matter how short-lived, 
combined with Athens’s inability to counter this transformation effectively, was 
the defining factor in the war�83 Once Sparta confronted Athens in battle at sea, 
it directly threatened the Athenians with loss of the foundation of their power�
Far from being a sideshow of only secondary importance, the naval and 
maritime dimension of the Peloponnesian War was of critical importance to the 
conduct, and indeed the outcome, of the war� Too much has been made of tech-
nological limitations, prejudicing the proper study of maritime operations and 
their impact on the history of the period� The Peloponnesian War was fought 
primarily at and from the sea, and the outcome of the war was decided by the 
ability of Athens and Sparta to use sea power effectively�
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